

Critolaus and the Peripatetic Telos

Stephen White (sawhite@utexas.edu) for Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy Forum, 24/2/25

T1. Cicero, *On Ends* 5.14 ≈ 1B Sharples, 11 Wehrli

<p>praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et suavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio. summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dissentit de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos, et quidem est gravitate proximus, et redundat oratio, ac tamen <ne> is quidem in patriis institutis manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. hic quoque suus est de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli fuisse et Polemonis docet.</p>	<p>I'm leaving many out, including the learned and eloquent Hieronymus, though why I should still call him a Peripatetic I don't know. He declared the supreme good is absence of distress; but anyone who dissents about the supreme good dissents about the entire philosophical system. Critolaus wished to emulate the ancients, and he comes very close to them in seriousness and argues elaborately, and yet <not> even he maintains their founding principles. Diodorus, his student, conjoins virtue with absence of distress; he too is his own man, and since he disagrees about the supreme good, he cannot be truly called a Peripatetic. But our friend Antiochus, I think, upholds very faithfully the position of the ancients, which he claims both Aristotle and Polemo shared.</p>
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* Two questions about the telos: 1) specification or 2) definition

T1a. Cicero, *On Ends* 5.15-16

<p>Cognitis autem rerum finibus, cum intellegitur quid sit et bonorum extremum et malorum, inventa vitae via est conformatioque omnium officiorum, †cum† igitur quo quidque referatur; ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest.</p>	<p>Once we know the ends of things and understand what the best good and worst bad are, then we have found a pathway for our lives and the coherence in all befitting conduct, by reference to which anything may be assessed; and out of that it is possible to find and construct what everyone seeks, a rational method for living happily.</p>
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T2. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 2.129.10 = 18H Sharples, 20 Wehrli

<p>Κριτόλαος δέ, ὁ καὶ αὐτὸς Περιπατητικός, τελειότητα ἔλεγεν κατὰ φύσιν εὐροοῦντος βίου, τὴν ἐκ τῶν τριῶν γενῶν συμπληρουμένην τριγενικὴν τελειότητα μὴύων.</p>	<p>Critolaus, also a Peripatetic, maintained that it [sc. the end] is a perfection in the conduct of life flowing well according to nature, thereby disclosing the triadic perfection <i>composed</i> out of the three kinds [sc. of goods].</p>
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Stromata 2.127-33

1. Hedonists: 1A pleasure: Epicurus, Cyrenaics
1B no distress: Epicurus; Deinomachos & Calliphon, Hieronymus Peripatetic, Diodorus Peripatetic
2. Virtue: 2A Aristotle (virtue plus)
2B Stoics: Zeno, Cleanthes, <Diogenes,> Antipater, Archedemus, Panaetius, Posidonius, “younger”
2C deviant: Aristo (indifference), Herillus (knowledge), “younger Academy” (suspension)
2D other: Lyco Peripatetic (joy), **Critolaus** Peripatetic
3. Predecessors: 3A Physici (theory): Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Pythagoras (via Heraclides)
3B Abderites: Democritus, Hecataeus, Apollodotos Cyzicus, Nausiphanes, Diotimus
3C Antisthenes
(1A Annicerians, Epicurus, Metrodorus)
4. Original Academy: Plato (at length), Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo

T3. Doxography A: Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.3b (46.5-22) ≈ 18I Sharples, 19 Wehrli

<p>λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν Στωϊκῶν ὀρικῶς, τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ ἔνεκα πάντα πράττεται καθηκόντως, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα· κακείνως οὐ χάριν τᾶλλα, αὐτὸ δ' οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα· καὶ πάλιν ἐφ' ὃ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πραττόμενα καθηκόντως τὴν ἀναφορὰν λαμβάνει, αὐτὸ δ' ἐπ' οὐδέν. ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν νεωτέρων Περιπατητικῶν τῶν ἀπὸ Κριτολάου τὸ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν συμπεληρωμένον, τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ ἐκ τῶν τριῶν γενῶν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς. οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰγαθὰ μέρη γίνεται τοῦ τέλους· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ σωματικά, οὔτε τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτός, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχικῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνεργήματα μόνης. κρεῖττον οὖν ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ συμπληρούμενον ἐνεργούμενον, ἵνα τὸ χρηστικὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐμφαίνεται. τοῦτο δ' οἱ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον φιλοσοφοῦντες οὐ προσδέχονται λέγειν ἐνεργούμενον, διὰ τὸ παθητικὸν ὑποτιθεσθαι τὸ τέλος, οὐ πρακτικόν, ἡδονὴ γάρ· ὅθεν καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἀποδιδόασιν τοῦ τέλους τὸ οἰκείως διατιθένα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸ χωρὶς τῆς ἐπ' ἄλλο τι ἀπάσης ἐπιβολῆς.</p>	<p>The Stoics define <i>telos</i> as what everything is done befittingly for but is not itself done for anything; also as what all other things are for but itself not for anything; and again as what everything befitting done in life refers up to but itself refers up to nothing. The younger Peripatetics after Critolaus say it [sc. the <i>telos</i>] is what is <i>composed</i> out of all the goods; and that was from the three kinds of goods. But that is incorrect; for not all good things become parts of the end: neither bodily ones nor external ones do, only activations of a soul's virtue. It was better then to say activating instead of <i>composed</i>, in order to convey virtue's deployment. The Epicureans do not agree to call this activating because they make the <i>telos</i> affective, not active, since it is pleasure; hence they also render the concept of the <i>telos</i> as by itself inducing affiliation to itself apart from any attention to anything else.</p>
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T3a. Clement *Stromata* 2.128.3-5

<p>οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη τέλος ἀποδιδόασιν εἶναι τὸ ζῆν κατ' ἀρετὴν, οὔτε δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὔτε τὸ τέλος παντὶ τῷ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντι παρεῖναι· βασανιζόμενον γὰρ καὶ τύχαις ἀβουλήτοις περιπίπτοντα τὸν σοφὸν καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἀσμένως ἐθέλοντα διαφεύγειν μὴ εἶναι μήτε μακάριον μήτ' εὐδαιμόνα. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ χρόνου τινὸς τῇ ἀρετῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἐν μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ περιγίνεται, ἢ καὶ ἐν τελείῳ συνίσταται, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστιν, ὡς φασι, παῖς εὐδαιμόνων ποτέ· τέλειος δ' ἂν εἴη χρόνος ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος. συμπληροῦσθαι τοίνυν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ τῆς τριγενείας τῶν ἀγαθῶν. οὔτ' οὖν ὁ πένης οὔθ' ὁ ἄδοξος, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ ἐπίνοσος, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν οἰκέτης ἢ τις, κατ' αὐτοὺς.</p>	<p>The followers of Aristotle declare that the end is living virtuously but that neither eudaimonia nor the end is found in everyone who is virtuous; for they deny a wise man, if he is tortured or encounters awful misfortunes and is therefore all too willing to escape his life, is either blessed or eudaimon. For virtue also needs some time; for it does not come about in a single day, and it takes a full time to develop, since no child, as they say, is ever eudaimon; and a full time would be a human life. Thus eudaimonia is <i>composed</i> out of the triad of goods. So neither a poor nor a disreputable person (sc. is eudaimon), nor again a sickly one, nor again if one is a servant, in their view.</p>
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T3b. Sextus *M* 11.30, cf. *PH* 3.172

<p>ἦσαν δὲ οἱ φάσκοντες ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν, οἱ δ' οὕτως ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ τὸ συλλαμβανόμενον πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, τινὲς δὲ τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν εὐδαιμονίας· εὐδαιμονία δὲ ἐστὶν, ὡς οἱ τε περὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα καὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον ἀπέδοσαν, εὐροια βίου.</p>	<p>Some used to say that what is in itself desirable is good, others that what combines for eudaimonia is good, and some that it's what is a <i>component</i> of eudaimonia; and eudaimonia, as the followers of Zeno and Cleanthes and Chrysippus declared, is a good flow in the conduct of life.</p>
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T3c. Plutarch, *On Common Notions* 4 (1060b-c)

<p>ἤδη τοίνυν αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκόπει πρῶτον, εἰ κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐστὶν ἐννοίας ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει τοὺς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιάφορα νομίζοντας καὶ μήθ' ὑγίαιαν μήτ' εὐεξίαν μήτε κάλλος μήτ' ἰσχὺν ἡγουμένους αἰρετὰ μηδ' ὠφέλιμα μηδὲ λυσιτελεῖν μηδὲ συμπληρωτικὰ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τελειότητος, μήτε τάναντία φευκτὰ καὶ βλαβερά, πηρώσεις ἀλγηδόνας αἰσχη νόσους· ὧν αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πρὸς ἃ μὲν ἀλλοτριοῦν πρὸς ἃ δ' οἰκιοῦν ἡμᾶς τὴν φύσιν.</p>	<p>Then examine this very point first, whether it follows common notions that they are consistent with nature in counting the natural things indifferent and in holding that neither are health or fitness, good looks or strength either desirable or beneficial or advantageous or <i>components</i> of natural perfection, nor are their opposites undesirable and harmful, disabilities, pains, deformities, diseases – things to which they themselves maintain nature in the one case alienates us and in the other case affiliates us. end our own lives and give up on living.</p>
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T3d. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.30 = 3A.5-7 Sharples

<p>τέλος δὲ ἐν ἐξέθετο χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν συνπλήρωμα ἐκ τριῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι· τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν, ἃ δὴ καὶ πρῶτα τῇ δυνάμει καλεῖ· ἐκ δευτέρων δὲ τῶν περὶ σῶμα, υγείας καὶ ἰσχύος καὶ κάλλους καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων· τῶν δὲ ἐκτός, πλοῦτου καὶ εὐγενείας καὶ δόξης καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. τὴν τε ἀρετὴν μὴ εἶναι αὐτάρκη πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν· προσδεῖσθαι γὰρ τῶν τε περὶ σῶμα καὶ τῶν ἐκτός ἀγαθῶν, κακοδαιμονήσοντος τοῦ σοφοῦ κἂν ἐν πόνοις ἢ, κἂν ἐν πενίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις. τὴν μέντοι κακίαν αὐτάρκη πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα παρῆ αὐτῇ τὰ ἐκτός ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ περὶ σῶμα.</p>	<p>He propounded a single telos: use of virtue in a fully developed conduct of life. He said eudaimonia is a <i>composite</i> of three kinds of goods: those concerning the soul, which he also calls first in potency; second are those concerning the body, such as health, strength, beauty, and the like; and external goods, such as wealth, good family, reputation, and the like. And virtue is not sufficient for eudaimonia, for it also needs both bodily and external goods, given that a wise man will be unhappy even if suffering or impoverished or the like; but vice is sufficient for unhappiness, even in the presence of many external and bodily goods.</p>
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T4. Doxography C: Stobaeus *Anthology* 2.7.14 (126 W) = 15A.11 Sharples, 8 Tsouni

<p>ἐπεὶ δὴ μεγάλη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστὶν ὑπεροχὴ κατὰ τε τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ κατὰ τὸ δι' αὐθ' αἰρετὸν παρὰ τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθὰ, κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐκ εἶναι συνπλήρωμα τὸ τέλος ἐκ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲ τὸ τυγχάνειν ἀπάντων, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν ἐν τοῖς περὶ σῶμα καὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἀγαθοῖς ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ κυριωτάτοις. ὅθεν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐν πράξεσι προηγουμέναις κατ' εὐχὴν· τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθὰ ποιητικὰ λέγεσθαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τῷ συμβάλλεσθαι τι παρόντα· τοὺς δὲ νομίζοντας αὐτὰ συνπληροῦν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι ἢ μὲν εὐδαιμονία βίος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ βίος ἐκ πράξεως συνπεπλήρωται· τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἢ τῶν ἐκτός ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πρᾶξις εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτὸ οὔθ' ὅλως ἐνέργειαν.</p>	<p>Since virtue surpasses bodily and external goods by far both in what it produces and in being desirable in itself, it follows that the end is not a <i>composite</i> of bodily and external goods, nor attaining them all, but rather (it is) living virtuously among bodily and external goods, either all or most of them and the most important. Hence eudaimonia is a virtuous activity in actions prioritized in aspiration. Bodily and external goods are said to be productive of eudaimonia because their presence contributes something; but people who think those <i>compose</i> eudaimonia are mistaken, because eudaimonia is a way of life, and that is <i>composed</i> out of action; but no bodily or external good is either an action itself or an activity at all.</p>
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* Constitution: *A constitutes B iff A* is a diachronic part of B and B is a temporally extended whole.

* Composition: *A composes B iff A* is a synchronic part of B and B is a temporally extended part.

T5. Doxography C: Stobaeus *Anthology* 2 7.17 (129.19-130.12) – 15A.15 Sharples, 12 Tsouni

<p>τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονία ἐκ τῶν καλῶν γίνεσθαι καὶ προηγουμένων πράξεων. διὸ καὶ δι' ὅλων εἶναι καλήν, καθάπερ καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς ἐνέργειαν δι' ὅλων ἐντεχνον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκβιβάζειν τὴν παράληψιν τῶν ὑλικῶν τῆς εἰλικρινείας τοῦ καλοῦ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ὡς οὐδὲ τὴν τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἐντεχνον δι' ὅλων ἐνέργειαν τὴν τῶν ὀργάνων χρῆσιν. πᾶσαν μὲν γὰρ πράξιν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τινα ψυχῆς. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ πράττων συγχρηταί τισι πρὸς τὴν τελείωσιν τῆς προθέσεως, μέρη ταῦτα οὐ χρῆ νομίζειν τῆς ἐνεργείας, καίτοι γε ἐπιζητούσης ἑκατέρας τῶν εἰρημένων ἑκάτερον, οὐ μὴν ὡς μέρος, ὡς δὲ ποιητικὸν τῆς τέχνης. τὰ γὰρ ὧν ἄνευ πράττειν ὀτιοῦν ἀδύνατον μέρη τῆς ἐνεργείας λέγειν οὐκ ὀρθόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐπινοεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ ὅλου, τὰ δ' ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ κατὰ τὸ ποιητικὸν τῷ φέρειν καὶ συνεργεῖν εἰς τὸ τέλος.</p>	<p>Eudaimonia comes about out of honorable and prioritized actions. For that reason it is also honorable throughout, the same way as activity on pipes is expert throughout; for the inclusion of materials does not deprive eudaimonia of its honorable purity, as the use of instruments (doesn't deprive) the activity of medical expertise (from being) thoroughly expert. For every action is an activity of soul; but since the agent utilizes things to achieve his objective, those should not be considered parts of the activity, even though both of the activities mentioned require something, not however as a part but as productive for the expertise. For to maintain that the things without which it is impossible to do anything at all are parts of the activity is not correct; for a part is conceived as being a <i>component</i> of the whole, but things without which as being productive by supporting and cooperating in the end.</p>
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T5a. Doxography B: Stobaeus *Anthology* 2 7.5g (71.15-72.5)

<p>τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τελικά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν φρόνιμος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ φίλος ποιητικά μόνον ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ· χαρὰ δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνη καὶ θάρρος καὶ φρονίμη περιπάτησις τελικά μόνον ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ· αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι καὶ ποιητικά ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τελικά, καὶ γὰρ ἀπογεννῶσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ συμπληροῦσι μέρη αὐτῆς γινόμεναι.</p>	<p>Some goods are final, some are productive, and some are both. Now a prudent person and a friend are only productive goods, while joy, gladness, confidence, and prudent walking are only final goods; but all the virtues are both productive and final goods, since they both generate eudaimonia and <i>compose</i> it in becoming parts of it.</p>
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T5b. Clement, *Stromata* 2.133.5-6

<p>Ξενοκράτης τε ὁ Καλχηδόνιος τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποδίδωσι κτήσιν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως. εἶτα ὡς μὲν ἐν ᾧ γίνεται, φαίνεται λέγων τὴν ψυχὴν· ὡς δ' ὑφ' ὧν, τὰς ἀρετάς· ὡς δ' ἐξ ὧν ὡς μερῶν, τὰς καλὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας ἔξεις τε καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις· ὡς δ' ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ, τὰ σωματικά καὶ τὰ ἐκτός.</p>	<p>Xenocrates of Calchedon declares eudaimonia a possession of our proper virtue with the ability to assist it. Then he plainly states that it is located in the soul, caused by the virtues, made up of honorable actions and virtuous states, dispositions, movements, and conditions as its parts, and not possible without bodily and external things.</p>
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T5c. Sextus M 9.337-8

<p>τὸ δὲ μόριον καὶ αὐτὸ λέγεται διχῶς, καὶ ὅτε μὲν ὡς διαφέρον τοῦ ιδίως νοουμένου μέρους, καθά φασιν αὐτὸ μέρος μέρους εἶναι, καθάπερ δάκτυλον μὲν τῆς χειρός, οὗς δὲ τῆς κεφαλῆς, ὅτε δ' ὡς μὴ διαφέρον ἀλλὰ μέρος ὄν τοῦ ὅλου, καθὼ τινές φασιν κοινῶς μέρος εἶναι τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν τοῦ ὅλου. προδιηρθρωμένων δὲ τούτων, καὶ τοῦ ὅλου κατὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν συμπλήρωσιν νοουμένου, χωρῶμεν λοιπὸν ἐπὶ τὴν σκέψιν.</p>	<p>The term “portion” is itself used in two ways: sometimes differently from what is properly thought of as a part, in the way they say it is a part of a part, just a finger of a hand, an ear of a head; other times not differently but as being a part of the whole, in the way some say generally a part is a <i>component</i> of the whole. With these initial distinctions made, and with the whole thought of as a <i>composition</i> out of the parts, let's proceed to our examination.</p>
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